INTRODUCTION
The framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant (hereafter Framework Decision)
1 is the first elaboration of the mutual recognition principle, which became the leading principle of judicial co-operation in criminal matters in the European Union after the Tampere European Council. The decision replaced the classical extradition procedures in reciprocal relations between the member states.
The adoption of the Framework Decision at European level and its implementation in member states' legal orders raised many concerns as to its impact on fundamental rights and individual liberty, as well as other common legal principles of European states. The haste with which this dossier was handled, as well as the political pressure brought to bear on it, did not encourage reflection during the negotiations.
The European Arrest Warrant in the Italian Republic
December 2001, between the Prime Minister of Belgium (holder of the European Union Presidency), Mr Verhofstadt, and his Italian counterpart, Mr Berlusconi, the Italian veto was removed, and the instrument was agreed upon a week after the veto during the Laeken European Council of 14-15 December 2001. Unlike the Minister for Justice, the Italian Prime Minister seemed not concerned about the list of crimes excluded from double criminality protection. 6 Relying on a legal opinion of two prominent Italian jurists, Justice Caianiello and Justice Vassalli, 7 both a former Minister for Justice and President emeritus of the Constitutional Court, the Prime Minister raised objections on the consistency of the Framework Decision with fundamental principles of the Italian legal order, while at the same time surprisingly accepting the Framework Decision. Thus, under pressure of the European governments the Italian veto was removed.
In the press release of 11 December 2001, 8 Mr. Berlusconi stated that the Italian government would start all domestic procedures to make the Framework Decision compatible with supreme principles of the Italian constitutional legal order on fundamental rights. Interestingly, Berlusconi also declared that the Italian judiciary would be adapted to European models in respect of constitutional principles.
It is hard to draw legal significance from this declaration. Indeed, it is not possible to imagine any domestic legal procedure that could make the European Framework Decision consistent with the Italian national order, because any intervention on it should take place at the European stage during the negotiations. Another interpretation could be that the European Framework Decision required constion the European Arrest Warrant and Surrender Procedures Between Member States of the European Union', in R. Blekxtoon and W. van Ballegoo? (eds.), Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2005), p. 13 et seq. 6 This paved the way to some remarks on the contradictory positions taken by the Ministry of Justice and the Prime Minister. See V. Grevi, supra n. 5, p. 119 et seq. 7 See V. Caianiello and G. Vassalli, 'Parere sulla proposta di decisione-quadro sul mandato di arresto europeo', 42 Cassazione penale (2002), p. 462-467, which concentrate especially on Art. 2 of the Framework Decision. In a nutshell, the jurists argued that the Framework Decision was in breach of constitutional norms concerning the principle of 'sufficient certainty' (tassatività) of criminal norms and the principle of 'legal prerogative' (riserva di legge) in criminal matters as to the list of thirty-two crimes; violation of constitutional principles on personal freedom, contrast with constitutional discipline of extradition. They also argued for a violation of Art. 31 letter e) and Art. 34(2) letter b) of the EU Treaty. For a different and equally authoritative position, tackling similar problems and refuting them, see A. Cassese, 'Mandato di arresto europeo e Costituzione', 24 Quaderni costituzionali (2004), p. 129 et seq.; V. Grevi, supra n. 5, p. 123 et seq. 8 The statement is: 'Per dare esecuzione alla decisione quadro sul mandato di cattura europeo il governo italiano dovrà avviare le procedure di diritto interno per rendere la decisione quadro stessa compatibile con i principi supremi dell'ordinamento costituzionale in tema di diritti fondamentali, e per avvicinare il suo sistema giudiziario ed ordinamentale ai modelli europei, nel rispetto dei principi costituzionali'. EuConst 4 (2008) tutional revision. This meaning is even more problematic because of the reference to supreme principles of the constitutional legal order on fundamental rights: it is indeed common knowledge that those principles constitute 'implicit limits' to constitutional revision. 9 As to the second part of the declaration, the asserted need for approximation of the Italian judiciary to some vaguely defined 'European models' raises suspicions, bearing in mind the relation between Mr. Berlusconi and the judiciary. Indeed, there is no clarity on the parameters of this 'approximation' (to which European model, or models, should the Italian system be approximated?), nor does the declaration provide any reason why a reform of the judiciary would be justified or necessary in this case.
10 If the meaning of the declaration is, more plainly, that the Framework Decision needed to be implemented by the legislature in a manner that respects constitutional principles on fundamental rights, then the whole declaration could be considered pointless because this is obvious. Perhaps the declaration, which was attached to the text of the Framework Decision, is only an attempt to justify the incoherent Italian behaviour (first the veto and then the sudden reconsideration of its position) during the last stage of the negotiations on the Framework Decision.
At the same time, the stress on domestic reforms in the Prime Minister's declaration could lead one to think that, although accepted at European level, the Framework Decision still had a long way to go in its implementation at domestic level. More specifically, the well-known judicial problems of the then-Prime Minister of Italy, his position towards judges and, more generally, the climate of political hostility against the judiciary, made it improbable that the Italian government would be very eager to implement it.
11 European judicial co-operation was not at all a priority on Berlusconi's political agenda; 12 he was keener on reforms of the judiciary with the aim of limiting the independence of the public prosecutor and of 10 More generally, the reform of the judiciary has been a political target of the parliamentary majority during the XIV th legislature (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . This declaration stresses the accent on (constitutional) reforms of the judiciary: one might get the impression that the Italian government was willing to take some impetus from the EAW instrument to push this political goal. Cf. V. Grevi, supra n. 5, p. 119 et seq. 11 Minister of Reforms and Devolution Bossi (Lega Nord) defined the European Union as 'gallows-land', the land of gallows (in Italian, 'Forcolandia'); Mr. Berlusconi, at the Laeken European Council of mid-Dec. 2001, expressed concerns about an international conspiracy ('internazionale giacobina') of magistrates. See V. Grevi, supra n. 5, p. 120 et seq.; F. Impalà, 'The European Arrest Warrant in the Italian legal system. Between mutual recognition and mutual fear within the European area of Freedom, Security and Justice', 1 Utrecht Law Review (2005), p. 56-78, <www.utrechtlaw review.org/publish/articles/000009/article.pdf>. 12 It is common knowledge that his political friends considered the personal problems with justice of Berlusconi to be the result of a plot hatched by a lobby of left-wing judges.
dealing with specific (and personal) justice problems. 13 These observations seem to be confirmed by the fact that, despite the Prime Minister's declaration of December 2001, the Italian government took no initiative whatsoever, neither for constitutional or other legislative reforms in the field of the Framework Decision nor for the implementation of the Framework Decision.
14 Italian legislation implementing the Framework Decision was passed only on 22 April 2005, sixteen months after the European deadline.
The Framework Decision in the Italian Parliament

15
Although the Italian government eventually accepted the Framework Decision on the arrest warrant, it did not take its responsibility on the domestic stage. In fact, it never presented any legislative initiative to the Parliament on the transposition of the Framework Decision, unlike other governments; 16 it was in fact the political opposition that submitted a draft bill to the Chamber of Deputies.
17
The ensuing debate between majority and opposition is characterised by a dilemma between trust and distrust. The majority approved a wide range of amendments, changing the draft bill to such an extent that it became unacceptable to the initiators, who therefore withdrew their signature from the bill, in order to be able to submit another draft bill on the Framework Decision later on. While the debate focused on the threat to individual liberties and the lack of judicial guarantees in 14 Unlike in France, where the Constitution was changed by adding a paragraph to Art. 88-2 ('Statutes shall determine the rules relating to the European arrest warrant pursuant to acts adopted under the Treaty on European Union'). See R. Errera, ' the Framework Decision itself, the position of the parliamentary majority was the expression of a more general negative attitude: a lack of trust in the other European Union member states and their protection of fundamental rights. As the minority protested, even bilateral extradition treaties with non-European countries are not regarded with such distrust. The parliamentary majority defended traditional extradition procedures as if they were the highest achievement of legal civilisation. This stands in stark contrast to the law and the practice of extradition in many countries.
As concerns extradition in particular, it must be remembered that until 1988 the criminal procedural code offered less protection to extraditable persons than to those suspected or accused in Italian criminal procedures (habeas corpus). Furthermore, the Italian Cassation Court in its early case-law accepted this difference.
THE ITALIAN ACT IMPLEMENTING THE FRAMEWORK DECISION
A Framework Decision represents the 'translation' into the Third Pillar of the EC directive. Just like a directive, it is a legal instrument that needs to be implemented at the national level in order to be applied domestically. However, while according to the case-law of the Court of Justice directive can have direct effect under circumstances, this is excluded for Framework Decisions by the Union Treaty (Article 34(2)(b)). Nevertheless, they can derive some 'indirect' effects from the duty of consistent interpretation. 19 For this reason, the Framework Decision and the twenty-seven implementing acts form a complex system of legislation. Even though the Framework Decision on European Arrest Warrant purported to be the first legislative application of the principle of mutual recognition and was not meant 18 E. Marzaduri, Libertà personale e garanzie giurisdizionali nel procedimento di estradizione passiva (Milano, Giuffré 1993) p. 157-158, p. 101 et seq., p. 141. Indeed the doctrine of extradition in the 1930s fascist code, which remained in force until 1988 despite the entering into for or the new Constitution in 1948, conceived extradition as a form of interstate collaboration and co-operation, as demonstrated by the strengthening of the function and powers of the Minister of Justice within the procedure. The lack of means to question the legality of measures establishing custody and the absence of release from prison for exhaustion of maximal time limits, just to mention two aspects, made personal freedom nothing but a chimera for the individuals whose extradition was requested from the Italian Republic. to be a harmonising measure, it de facto led (also) to the approximation of national legislation on surrender procedures between European states. 20 At the same time, the lack of an infringement procedure comparable to the one in the EC, leaving Third Pillar legislation without a powerful enforcement mechanism at the supranational level, 21 gives national legislatures ample room to deviate from it, as an analysis of the Italian act implementing the Framework Decision shows. The emphasis in Article 1(1), the first of several provisions on constitutional guarantees, on the duty to protect constitutional fundamental rights contrasts with the attitude on the European level. The European Union Council agreed unanimously not to mention protection of fundamental rights in the actual text of the Framework Decision, on the assumption that a clause in the Preamble 25 was enough to express the European commitment to the individual's fundamental rights. The national governments apparently were not interested in developing this commitment beyond the 'embryonic stage'. This fundamental rights deficiency is commonly perceived as a weak point of the Framework Decision. 26 Scholars have criticised this aspect and have tried to suggest remedies. 27 Moreover, the Commission has initiated European legislation on common procedural minimum standards to smooth the functioning of the mutual recognition system, 28 and the Italian Parliament has emphasized the need to respect fundamental rights.
Fundamental rights as limits to mutual recognition
Article 2 of the Italian Act states that, in conformity Article 6 EU and recital 12 of the preamble of the Framework Decision, the execution of the European arrest warrants must respect fundamental rights and principles contained in both international treaties and the Constitution. It specifically mentions Article 5 (the right to liberty and security of person) and Article 6 (due process and fair trial rights) of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter, ECHR), and constitutional principles such as the protection of personal freedom, due process, the principle of personal culpability, and proportionate sanctioning. A strong core of both international and constitutional rules protecting individuals against public powers underpins the Italian legal framework for the operation of the European arrest warrants. In this context the position of the ECHR as a point of reference in the search for common European standards is remarkable.
Furthermore, Article 2(3) (redundantly) states that Italy shall refuse execution of European arrest warrants in case of a serious and persistent breach of fundamental rights enshrined in the ECHR (personal freedom and due process rights) by the issuing state, as ascertained by the European Council under Article 7 EU. The impact of this provision is uncertain, because it subordinates refusal of the execution of a warrant to a declaration of the Council under Article 7 EU, which is a notorious highly political procedure. Moreover, the European Framework Decision (at Recital 10) itself under such circumstances makes possible the more drastic measure of suspending the whole system of the European arrest warrants.
Article 18 tackles this seeming contradiction by presenting a detailed list of grounds for refusal of an arrest warrant. This demonstrates that the human rights discourse entails grounds for refusal to surrender individuals. These are more numerous than in the Framework Decision, 29 which may hamper the efficient cooperation schemes in criminal matters developed under the mutual recognition principle. Nevertheless, both the Third Pillar legislature and those of the member states', although in different degrees, in principle resolve the antithesis between fundamental rights of persons involved and duty to co-operate among investigative authorities in favour of fundamental rights by formulating exceptions to mutual recognition.
It is indeed essential that fundamental rights and other refusal grounds operate as corrective mechanisms to the quasi-automatic functioning of mutual recognition as in the Framework Decision. This is so because mutual recognition cannot be absolute, but only dependent on the respect of certain pre-conditions, especially when it operates in a context of different national justice systems in an area with such a high impact on personal freedom. 30 29 I.e., statement on respect for human rights in the Preamble, and lack of a ground for refusal based on the risk of breach of fundamental rights in the legal text; grounds for refusal enumerated at Art. 3 and 4 of the Framework Decision.
30 See on the concept of 'conditionality' of the mutual recognition principle L. Marin, Il principio di mutuo riconoscimento nello spazio penale europeo (Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica 2006) p. 65-74. The principle of mutual recognition goes beyond the single measure to be recognised, but implies to some extent a 'systemic' recognition of foreign legal systems, including criminal law, procedural rules, and also enforcement institutions, such as the judicial power and its role within the constitutional system. I therefore argue that in an area of law with a high impact on personal freedom, mutual recognition can only be based on a shared legal culture and judicial practice. In any case, EuConst 4 (2008) One may wonder why the legislature, especially the European one, chose not to match the first mutual recognition instrument more strongly to a European logic of active protection of fundamental rights in order to better reinforce its programme of strengthening transnational co-operation among judges. Anyway, it is clear that the lack of fundamental rights guarantees in the text of the Framework Decision only inspired member states to take many different directions, thus encouraging divergence in this very sensitive field.
31
Refusal grounds
As said before, Article 18 holds more grounds for refusal of the execution of an arrest warrant than the European Framework Decision itself. The Italian legislator extended the grounds for mandatory refusal which are contained in Article 3 of the Framework Decision. Furthermore, optional grounds of refusal listed in Article 4 of the Framework Decision became mandatory. Though the latter can be found in implementation acts of other member states as well, taken together with the mandatory refusal grounds added by the Italian legislator, the situation is nevertheless problematic from the perspective of compliance with the Framework Decision. In all, Italian law formulates twenty mandatory grounds for refusal.
Most of the refusal grounds are inspired by the rationale of protecting human rights. Execution of an European arrest warrant must be refused when it is issued to accuse or punish someone for reason of sex, race, religion, ethnical origin, nationality; when a maximum limit for pre-trial detention is absent in the issuing state; when it is issued for a political offence; when the conviction took place in an unfair process in which the minimum rights of the accused as enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR were violated; when there is a risk that the requested person will be sentenced to death or tortured. 32 However, other refusal grounds are motivated by the wish to control the jurisdiction of the issuing state from a perspective of substantive criminal law. This concerns situations in which a right was violated with the consent of whom could dispose of it, or the charged fact constitutes the exercise of a right, the execution of a duty, or has been determined by fortuitous event or force majeure; and the situation in which the requested person has immunity according to Italian law. 33 These latter refusal grounds refer to the idea of 
The mandatory refusal of surrender for political crimes (Article 18 under f), although excluded by the Framework Decision, corresponds to a prohibition in the Italian Constitution which is applicable to Italian citizens as well as to foreigners. 35 The ban to surrender to all those countries which do not have a maximum temporal limit for detention on remand pending trial (Article 18 under e) reflects a constitutional principle. Section 13(5) of the Constitution aims at limiting and controlling the employment of detention on remand pending trial. However, the ban set in Article 18, letter e) is certainly not proportionate, because it does not reckon with those legal systems based on continuous review mechanisms in order to achieve the same goals as Section 13.
Double criminality
36
As to the well-known list of thirty-two crimes for which Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision abolishes the double criminality requirement, the Italian Parliament adopted a contrary solution. In Article 7(1) it holds on to the double criminality check in principle. In Article 8, entitled 'mandatory surrender', the legislature states that the Italian courts will execute an arrest warrant without double criminality check for a list of facts, with the proviso that punishment requirements are met as requested in the European Framework Decision. However, it 34 See also M. Del Tufo, 'Il rifiuto della consegna motivato da esigenze di diritto sostanziale', in G. Pansini and A. Scalfati (dir. Zanichelli 1981) . Furthermore, the doctrine interpreted the possibility of refusal implicitly provided in the Framework Decision as expression of the non-discrimination clause. At the same time, the doctrine stressed the evolution of the European political context, i.e., with reference to 'de-politicization clauses' contained in many treaties. Through these clauses, contracting parties reciprocally engage not to consider a given set of crimes of a political nature for the purpose of extradition. See S. Buzzelli, 'Il mandato d'arresto europeo e le garanzie costituzionali sul piano processuale', in M. Bargis Articles 7 and 8 of the implementing Act therefore restore the double criminality check. The impression is that the legislature was uncomfortable and not ready for the partial abolition of double criminality, as demonstrated by the positions taken by the Minister of Justice during the negotiations and in Parliament. The Italian position seems at least partly the result of a misunderstanding of the concept of mutual recognition, inspired by some early scholars who sought satisfaction of the lex certa requirement in the Framework Decision itself.
39 Both minister and the Parliament regarded the Framework Decision as a federal law defining and punishing federal crimes. Under mutual recognition mechanisms, the lex certa principle has to be satisfied in the national legislation of the issuing member state. 40 Furthermore, according to the doctrine, the application of a European arrest warrant is problematic in the following situations: (1) the facts for which surrender is sought lack of criminalisation in the executing state and (2) the commission of the facts took place in the executing state. 41 In my opinion, the best solution for these cases would be to limit the extraterritorial effectiveness of the substantial criminal law of the issuing state. The lack of co-ordination of member states' criminal jurisdictions appears here in its dangerous potential: in these cases European arrest warrants indeed work as a 'resonator' for the most severe criminal The European Arrest Warrant in the Italian Republic rules, especially problematic when the conduct is not considered criminal by the executing state. However, the Framework Decision ignores the problem.
The right to a judicial remedy against surrender
Article 22 of the implementing Act provides for a judicial remedy before the Court of Cassation against the decision of the court of appeal on the surrender. On the basis of this provision, the only way to question the legality of an arrest warrant, the person requested can raise objections on grounds related either to its merit or to the law. The Court of Cassation has to decide within rigid time limits. 42 The Italian regulation fills a gap in the Framework Decision. The only procedural protection demanded by the Framework Decision is a right to be informed (Article 11) and to be heard by a judicial body in case the requested person opposes surrender (Article 14). In terms of (even) minimum defence rights to be incorporated into every national legal order, the Framework Decision is thus very minimalistic.
The Italian implementing Act by providing for a 'ricorso per Cassazione', in particular complies with Section 111(7) of the Constitution, which gives everybody the right to bring an action before the Court of Cassation against measures de libertate. 43 However, the Italian implementing Act goes further than this, as the appeal against a surrender decision can be based not only on grounds of law, but also factual grounds. pean arrest warrants have to be interpreted in compliance with the Framework Decision. Interpretation in conformity with the Framework Decision is indeed one of the two trends which characterise the case-law of the Cassazione until now. The other trend concerns interpretation of the implementation act in conformity with the Italian constitutional system in order to give procedural guarantees with regard to the arrest and surrender of the person requested. We will begin with the latter.
Interpreting the implementing Act in conformity with the Italian constitutional order
In its Spinazzola judgment of 2006 45 the Corte di Cassazione held that the period in which an arrest on the basis of an European arrest warrant should be validated (convalida dell'arresto) and precautionary measures (detention; misure cautelari) should be issued, is the same as that in the code of criminal procedure for purely national cases, i.e., 48 hours from the reception of the arrest report (verbale di arresto). The European Framework Decision does not change the applicability of the constitutionally based legal rules involved. 46 The aim of the arrest warrant's validation is to have the deprivation of liberty scrutinised by a court. In a second decision of that same year, 47 the Court held that the period of 48 hours in which the arrest should be validated, starts at the reception of the arrest report of the police, not at the moment the arrested person is heard by the court. 46 The reference is at Section 13 of the Constitution, stating: 'Personal liberty is inviolable. No form of detention, inspection or personal search is admitted, nor any other restrictions on personal freedom except by warrant which states the reasons from a judicial authority and only in cases and manner provided for by law. In exceptional cases of necessity and urgency strictly defined by law, the police authorities may adopt temporary measures which must be communicated within fortyeight hours to the judicial authorities and, if they are not ratified by them in the next forty-eight hours, are thereby revoked and become null and void. All acts of physical or moral violence against individuals subjected in any way to limitations of freedom are punished. (5) the applicability of the Italian procedural guarantees does not threaten the coherence of the execution of European arrest warrants in the European constitutional order.
Interpreting the implementing Act in conformity with the Framework Decision and international rules on extradition
Again, we can observe that the Corte di Cassazione is moving at two different levels. On a first level, the Court interprets the Italian implementing Act in conformity with the European Framework Decision, which is its immediate source. 49 They concern, inter alia, procedural provisions that could have severely hindered the practical functioning of the system of European arrest warrants if they had not been interpreted in the light of the Framework Decision. On a second level it treats the 'Italian-European' arrest warrant like conventional extradition 50 as regulated by the familiar European Convention of 1957. 51 Most of the activities of the Corte di Cassazione concern the first level.
A duty of co-operation among judicial authorities -----In several decisions, the Court tried to find a balance between the Italian court's option to refuse the execution of an arrest warrant for lack of necessary information in the surrender request and the option to ask the issuing court to additionally provide this information.
52 This seems to encourage Italian courts to establish direct contacts with their colleagues in order to limit hindrance of this mechanism of co-operation, and implies, in my analysis, a duty of Italian judges to co-operate with other European colleagues. This duty finds a basis on the European level in the principle of mutual trust, binding courts, 53 to which the Corte di Cassazione has referred several times. This principle of mutual trust draws on the principle of loyal co-operation in Article 10 of Community Treaty, which, mutatis mutandis, also applies to the Third Pillar. 54 The Court further had the opportunity to penalise the misuse of the Framework Decision surrender procedure. It quashed a surrender decision in a case in 49 Through systematic interpretation 'secundum legem'. 50 Through systematic interpretation 'secundum jus'. which the requested persons were not suspected or accused of the crime in question, but surrender was merely requested because the investigating authorities deemed it useful to interrogate them in a preliminary investigation (concerning other suspects). 55 Indeed, these activities fall outside the scope of the Framework Decision. Meanwhile, the persons requested had already been surrendered to Belgium, because the Corte di Cassazione did not give its decision until after the surrender had already taken place. This case brings to the surface the open issue of the consequences of unlawful surrender, which seems to be one of the shortcomings of the system.
The scope of the judicial review -A significant group of decisions dealt with the requirements in the implementing act that 'serious circumstantial evidence of culpability' (gravi indizi di colpevolezza) against the requested person is a condition for approval of the surrender request (Article 17(4)) and that European arrest warrants have to be motivated (Article 18(1) under letter t).
The Corte di Cassazione held 56 that the condition of the existence of 'serious circumstantial evidence of culpability' does not mean that the Italian court should verify whether such evidence exists according to national law. 57 It merely implies that the Italian court has to verify whether according to the issuing authority there is circumstantial evidence indicative of a criminal fact. This less rigorous check is in compliance with Recital 8 of the Preamble of the Framework Decision, which refers to 'sufficient controls' in the execution of an arrest warrant.
The Court used the underlying concept of trust of the executing judge to reach a similar conclusion regarding the condition that European arrest warrants be supported by reasons. According to the higher court, this condition is satisfied if the issuing authority provides some factual evidence against the requested person. 58 These judgments refer to the principle of non-enquiry in traditional extradition law, which is (also) based on a principle of mutual trust and good faith between States that conclude extradition treaties, and which prohibits the thorough scrutiny of an extradition request and the underlying facts in a similar way as required by the Corte di Cassazione when it comes to European arrest warrants. In 61 In my opinion, the principle formulated by the Corte di Cassazione is the principle of 'equivalence' among different legal orders. It is natural to find a parallelism here with the economic integration of Europe. The scholars that dealt with the functioning of the internal market argued that the mutual recognition principle implies and is strictly related to the equivalence principle. See A. Bernel, Le principe d'équivalence ou de 'reconnaissance mutuelle' en droit communautaire (Zürich, Schulthess this sense, this case-law is not groundbreaking; it rather endorses to European arrest warrants a general principle of inter-state co-operation in criminal matters.
Maximum terms of detention on remand -
----Another group of decisions dealt with the condition in the implementing Act that surrender shall be refused if the legislation of the issuing state does not set a maximum term for detention on remand pending trial (Article 18(1), under letter e). This provision, which does not have a direct legal basis in the Framework Decision and which is not found in traditional extradition law, is inspired by Section 13(5) of the Italian Constitution, which states: 'The law establishes the maximum period of preventive detention'. Its goal is to limit detention on remand pending trial, balancing the principle of individual freedom and the presumption of innocence against the requirements of justice and protection of society. Many European countries perform the same balancing act with different instruments. As mentioned above, some of them, including the United Kingdom and Belgium, have adopted systems of continuous review of the legitimacy of detention on remand pending trial.
Article 18(1) under letter e) gave rise to different interpretations in the case-law of the supreme court, especially of Section VI of the Corte di Cassazione. In some judgments the literal interpretation was used and in others a teleological and systematic one was preferred. 59 This explains why the question was referred to the United Chambers (Sezioni Unite) of the Court, whose specific task is to resolve conflicting interpretations.
The Sezioni Unite 60 chose plainly to interpret Italian law consistently with the European Framework Decision. The ratio of the provision in the Italian implementing act, a direct expression of a constitutional provision, is to limit and control preventive detention. The Sezioni Unite indicated that there is a duty for the courts to look for and to consider 'functional equivalences', 61 i.e., different instru- 65 In the words of Monica Claes, The National Courts' Mandate in the European Constitution (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2006). 66 In my opinion, the Court goes beyond the duty of consistent interpretation as stated in Pupino by the ECJ. In contrast, the Court seems to apply here a kind of consistent interpretation similar to the domestic concept of interpretazione conforme a Costituzione (interpretation consistent with the Constitution). This is a peculiar interpretation adopted by the Corte Costituzionale to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality of a piece of legislation, but thus manipulating the literal wording of the legislation. See R. Romboli, 'La natura della Corte costituzionale alla luce della sua giurisprudenza più recente', paper available at <www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/dottrina/giustizia_costituzio nale/romboli.html>. 67 According to the author this case-law is a demonstration of the principle of the universalizability of deliberative choices. doing so, the Court clearly (also) acts according to its 'European mandate', 65 and not only as a supreme court of the national legal order. In fulfilling this task, the Court generously employs the teleological-systematic interpretation method, thus giving an extensive interpretation to national rules, especially when a literal interpretation would lead to a result inconsistent with the European Framework Decision. Paraphrasing, we could say that the Court practices the adage in dubio pro jure europeo. 66 The Court demonstrates its will to avoid national 'particularism' hindering the achievement of a common supranational result.
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Convergence of legal orders is certainly one of the virtues of consistent interpretation. This is satisfactory when one focuses on interactions between different legal orders. Nevertheless, consistent interpretation is problematic in view of the relationship between the national judiciary and the national parliament. The Corte di Cassazione seems to be aware of this, although not all its judgments seem to point in the same direction. This can be demonstrated by several judgments in which the interpretation of Article 18(1) under letter e) of the implementing Act, which as we have seen holds the requirement of a maximum period of detention on remand pending trial, was at stake.
On the one hand, the Sezioni Unite, by opting for an interpretation consistent with the Framework Decisions were deliberately avoiding the re-activation of a political discourse on this issue. The final result is not very different from the case-law 68 of the British House of Lords on the Extradition Act of 2003, which argues for an interpretation of national law consistent with the European Framework Decision. 69 On the other hand, when Section VI of the Corte di Cassazione opted for the literal interpretation in its decision No. 16542/2006, it was fully conscious of the risks involved for European judicial co-operation. 70 Furthermore, it recognised that neither the European Framework Decision nor traditional extradition provisions provide ground for the refusal of extradition based on the absence of a maximum period of detention on remand pending trial in the requesting state. And it admitted that the case-law of the Strasbourg Court seems to indicate that the Strasbourg Court prefers continuous reviews of preventive detention as more responsive to reasons of protection of personal freedom and the necessities of justice. In my view, the clear aim of the Corte di Cassazione was to let the problem surface, in order to bring it to the attention of the Constitutional Court and possibly the Parliament as well. Later that same year, the Venice Court of Appeal took the opportunity to refer the question to the Constitutional Court. 71 Generally speaking, this approach should be applauded, for several reasons. First of all, the question relates to (the broader issue of) interaction between the Italian and European legal orders, with systemic implications for constitutional law. Second, in line with the current trend of 'judicialisation' of law, the Constitutional Court is the proper institution to decide which antinomies deserve a judicial solution and which deserve a political answer from the Parliament. 72 In this way, the Court controls the delimitation of legislative and judicial powers. Third, the Italian Constitutional Court is one of the actors that can contribute to the constitutional dialogue at the heart of the European integration process. This is crucial for the consolidation of a legal order based on the rule of law and human rights, which are especially at stake in Third Pillar matters. As mentioned before, just before this article went to press, the Constitutional Court ruled on two questions concerning the Framework Decision. The first decision, order No. 109 of 18 April 2008, regards the question referred to it by the Venice Court of Appeal on Article 18(1) under e), discussed above. The Constitutional Court declared the question inadmissible because the Venice Court of Appeal had not demonstrated that other interpretations than the literal interpretation were not viable. The Constitutional Court pointed to the decision of the Sezioni Unite and embraced the interpretation given by that Court. In my view, the decision is in line with earlier case-law of the Corte Costituzionale. Indeed, the Italian Constitutional Court only declares a provision unconstitutional if no interpretation consistent with the Constitution (interpretazione conforme a Costituzione or adeguatrice) is viable, not simply because one of the possible interpretations breaches the Constitution. Moreover, the Court always requires that the referring courts demonstrate that an interpretation of the provision consistent with the Constitution is not possible.
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The second judgment, No. 143 of 16 May 2008, tackles a more technical aspect. 75 The Court declared Article 33 of the implementing Act to be (partially) unconstitutional, because it does not provide that pre-trial custody suffered abroad as effect of a European arrest warrant is to be taken into account for the purposes of determining the maximum term of detention in the analogous phase of the proceeding in Italy. In fact, the Italian code of criminal procedure not only provides for a maximum term of pre-trial detention for a criminal proceeding as a whole, but also for each 'internal' stage of the proceeding ('termini di fase', trial stage periods). It was almost impossible for the Constitutional Court to opt for a different solution. In 2004 the Court had already ruled on a similar question in the context of traditional extradition law (judgment No. 253). In that decision, Article 722 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, concerning detention on remand pending trial in cases in which Italy is the requesting state, was declared unconstitutional. Similarly to Article 33 of the act implementing the Framework Decision, Article 722 did not provide that the preventive detention abroad as a consequence of the request for extradition also had to be taken into account in determining the
